# Out of Africa: de opkomst van Afrikaanse varkenspest in Europa

#### Willie Loeffen Project leader CSF/ASF/PR





#### African swine fever (ASF)

- A severe haemorrhagic disease in pigs (Sus scrofa)
- Lethality up to 100%
- Clinical symptoms similar to classical swine fever
- Causative virus no relation to CSFV
- Limited host range (suids), includes soft ticks
  - Originally tick virus?





#### African swine fever (ASF)

Recognized in 1921 ASF is endemic in Africa Mainly sylvatic cycle Warthog, bushpig Soft ticks (Ornitodorus spp.) Reservoir for domestic pigs Direct/indirect transmission between pigs (Sus scrofa) is possible









#### Warthog

## Distribution of warthogs


Occasional records of warthogs

African swine fever



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#### Cycle ASFV






#### Out of Africa


#### • ASFV escaped from Africa only 3 times :

- 1957 Portugal
- 1960 Portugal
- 2007 Georgia









- 3 March 1985 suspicion ASF
  - Origin: meat products from Spain
- <2 weeks 8 additional infected farms detected</p>
- End of May last infected farm culled (total 12)
- Origin of infection:
  - 1x swill feeding (index-case)
  - 5x transportation infected piglets
  - 5x use of contaminated needles
  - 1x unknown



- March 1986, Zoetermeer, 94 finishing pigs
- 18 dead, 43 clinical signs
- Origin: swill feeding; possible relationship with Belgian outbreak in 1985
- Second farm infected through human contact (800 m distance)
- 15 contact farms preventively culled (6600 pigs)
  Duration: 2 months



#### ASF in Caribbean/South America

#### Cuba

- 1971 (from Spain?)
- 1978 reintroduction
- Eradication in 1980

#### Dominican Republic & Haïti

- 1978 (swill from planes from Spain in DR?)
- Eradication in 1984

#### Brazil

- 1978 (from Spain/Portugal?)
- Eradication in 1981





#### ASF from 1995 - 2007


# Endemic in AfricaEndemic on Sardinia






#### Introduction Georgia 2007








#### Russian Federation 2008-2012




#### 1<sup>st</sup> outbreak Ukraine




#### Russia & Eastern Europe 2012-2014







#### Eastern Europe 2014






#### <u>Belarus</u>

#### 2013

#### • 21June: Western region: backyard holding (16 pigs)

- Source of outbreak: swill feeding
- 4 July: Eastern region: commercial farm (>20.000 pigs)
  - Source of outbreak: unknown

#### No further cases reported



✓ The 1st specific control zone - 50 km Grodno and Vitebsk regions 8 districts (2248 settlements) pig livestock -20,5 thousand heads

 The 2nd specific control zone - 100 km Grodno, Vitebsk and Minsk regions
 18 districts (4578 settlements)
 pig livestock -43.7 thousand heads




#### Lithuania (2014)

- 25 Jan: 2 cases in WB, 5 and 40 km from border with Belarus
  - Most likely cause: uptake of infected material (kitchen waste)
- 24 July: ASF on large farm (19.400 pigs)
- 29 July: ASF in backyard holding (2 pigs)

#### <u>Lithuania</u>

#### Per 20 October:

- 10 WB cases
   (23 WB involved)
- 1 commercial farm (19.400 DP involved)
- 5 backyard farms (10 DP involved)





#### Poland (2014)

- 14 Feb: WB (dead), 900 m from border with Belarus
- 17 Feb: WB (dead), 3 km from border with Belarus (15 km from first case)
- 21 May: WB (dead) in river that borders Belarus
   29 May: Wild boar (dead, sow + 2 piglets), 2 km from border with Belarus (2 km from first case)
  - Source of outbreaks: WB crossing the border



#### Poland

#### 17 July: ASF on backyard farm (8 DP)

- Per 20 October:
  - 16 WB cases
     (53 WB involved)
  - 2 backyard farms (9 DP involved)





21 October

- 25 June: 1 case in WB and 1 in backyard holding, close to Belarus border
- I7 July: 1<sup>st</sup> case in WB and backyard holding, close to Estonian border
- 8 August: 1<sup>st</sup> case in WB in the middle of the country




#### <u>Latvia</u>

#### Per 20 October:

- 83 WB cases (119 WB involved)
- 32 backyard farms/ villages (585 DP involved)







#### <u>Estonia</u>

# 2 September: 1<sup>st</sup> case in WB, close to Latvian border (South border) 17 September: 1<sup>st</sup> case in WB on Northern shore



#### <u>Estonia</u>

#### Per 20 October:

#### • 4 WB cases/regions, 25 WB involved





#### Further expectations Baltic states and Poland

#### Predictions 2 months ago:

- Poland seems more or less under control. With ongoing threat of cross-border introductions from Belarus
- Lithuania, and especially Latvia, are in danger of ASFV becoming endemic in backyard holdings
- Estonia threatened by Latvian outbreaks



#### Other European countries at risk.

Finland threatened from Russia; relatively quite in that region at the moment Instability in Ukraine may support spread of ASFV In time: Moldavo and Romania at risk for introductions Later on: Slovakia, Hungary, Serbia, Bulgaria Countries further west currently low to negligible chance of ASFV introduction But even if the chance is once/50 years, it could be tomorrow!

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#### Expected mode of spread

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ENTRAL VET

#### Swill feeding / backyard holdings

- Probably main driving force for spread and reservoir of ASFV → uncontrollable (common practice in BH)!
- Uncontrolled slaughter of affected pigs
- Underreporting of ASF in backyard holdings (?)
- Long distance transmission possible
- Not only swill-feeding on purpose, but also "accidental"





#### Expected mode of spread





#### Wild boar

- "Middle man" for domestic pig?!
- Endemic infection in WB questionable
- Interaction with DP needed?
- Many questions!



#### Current threat for the Netherlands

#### Currently very low chance of introduction

- Wild boar still far, far away
- Double cleaning and disinfection of trucks returning to the Netherlands
- No import of live pigs or pork
- Pork for personal use!
  - Long distance truck drivers
  - Eastern European workers
- Hunting in Eastern Europe?



#### Current threat for the Netherlands

Limited opportunity for spread of ASFV?

- No backyard holdings
- No swill feeding / feeding kitchen waste
- Few WB with very limited contact with DP
- High infectious dose, so difficult indirect transmission

However, one introduction and damage is done!
 Focus on reducing chance of introduction!



### Thank you for your attention

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